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is the probability that the detector incorrectly declares
the jamming signal present. These probabilities depend
on several factors including the quality of the measure-
ments provided by the information source adopted. For
example, J=N0 introduced in Section II has a signifi-
cant impact on the detector performance. In general,
high J=N0 values should favor the detection process, re-
ducing false alarm rates. Under the same J=N0 condi-
tions and for a fixed false alarm probability, the
algorithm with the highest detection probability should
be preferred.
A possible criterion for setting the decision threshold
is to choose it such that a constant false alarm rate is ob-
tained. This criterion requires a probabilistic model char-
acterizing the decision statistic D in the absence of
jamming. In practice, this model may be difficult to ob-
tain since it has to account for different operating condi-
tions such as the number of satellites available, signal
propagation conditions, and receiver signal strength. For
this reason, the decision threshold is often set using cri-
teria based on Monte Carlo simulations or on empirical
results.
The approach described above is usually referred to
as classical detection theory [29] or block processing
where N measurements are used jointly to take a deci-
sion, in block. Other techniques are possible such as the
sequential approach [30] where information, e.g., signal
samples, is progressively introduced until a decision is
taken. The most known sequential approaches are the se-
quential probability ratio test (SPRT) and its variants
[30]. Sequential approaches have been recently adopted
for interference detection by [31].
The digital samples considered in (8) are just an ex-
ample of information source which can be used to design
jamming detection systems. In particular, information
can be extracted from almost any stage of a GNSS re-
ceiver. A schematic representation of the different GNSS
receiver stages and of the different information sources
is provided in Fig. 10. In addition to the digital samples,
the receiver front-end can provide hardware indicators
such as the AGC count and the noise floor estimator
[6], [32]. These hardware indicators usually assume
anomalous values in the presence of jamming as shown
in Fig. 3 and thus they can be used for the design of
jamming detection algorithms. The correlators intro-
duced in Section III-C, signal measurements, such as
carrier phases, Doppler frequencies and pseudoranges,
and signal quality indicators such as C=N0 estimates can
be used to design jamming detection techniques which
are called postcorrelation techniques [33]. The interest
of such techniques is that most commercial GNSS re-
ceivers provide the signal C=N0 and thus postcorrelation
techniques can be implemented in a large variety of
devices.
In Fig. 10, the final stage of a GNSS receiver, i.e., the
position velocity time (PVT) estimation block is not con-
sidered. Although detection can be performed also at this
stage, it is preferable to identify the presence of jamming
as soon as possible, in order to activate appropriate coun-
termeasures. Identifying jamming at the PVT level may
be too late. The different detection approaches developed
using the information sources described above are dis-
cussed in the following sections.
A. Hardware Indicators
In Section III, it was shown that jamming signals in-
fluence hardware components of the receiver front-end.
In particular, the AGC has to reduce its gain in order to
be able to minimize quantization errors and to effectively
represent a powerful input signal with a limited number
of bits.
The potential of the AGC as interference monitoring
tool was at first analyzed in [6] which considered the
case of pulsed interference in the GPS L5 frequency
band. Since then, several papers have investigated the
potential of the AGC count for jamming detection [13],
[34], [35].
More in detail, let gAGC½n" be the AGC count mea-
sured at the instant n. A simple criterion for detecting
the presence of jamming is to consider N consecutive
samples of the AGC count. If all the samples of gAGC½n"
are below a certain threshold, the presence of jamming
is declared
gAGC½n" G Th; for n ¼ 0; 1; . . . ;N $ 1: (9)
For example, in [13], jamming events were recorded if
the AGC count was going below a certain value for at
least 0.02 s. The main limitation of this approach is that
the selection of Th requires a thorough characterization
of the AGC behavior. For example, Izos et al. [13]
showed that three AGCs integrated in three front-ends of
the same model provided slightly different AGC values in
Fig. 10. Different approaches for jamming detection which can be
implemented using measurements from different receiver stages.
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the presence of the same interference power. Generally,
Th has to be set using an empirical approach.
More sophisticated approaches using the AGC count
can be adopted. In [35], the usage of a median filter [36]
followed by a low-pass filter is suggested to reduce the
impact of noise and to remove outliers in the AGC time
series. Detection is performed considering the filtered
version of gAGC½n". Lindstrom et al. [35] also recognized
that the AGC count is directly linked to the distance
between jammer and victim receiver. Thus, the AGC
count can also be used for locating the jamming source
[35], [37].
In order to mitigate the dependence of the AGC
count on the actual hardware device, Bhuiyan et al. [25]
suggested the usage of the AGC level changing rate de-
fined as
gr½n" ¼ gAGC½n" $ gAGC½n$ k"
kTs
(10)
where k % 1 is a selectable parameter and Ts is the sam-
pling rate of the AGC count time series. Also in this
case, gr½n" is compared against a decision threshold.
Several other metrics can be derived from the AGC
count which can be coupled with other approaches for
reveling the presence of jamming [32], [38].
Additional considerations on hardware indicators can
be found in [39] which discusses a possible implementa-
tion of a J=N estimator using the hardware components
available in a standard GNSS receiver.
B. Digital Signal Processing
Methods based on digital signal processing work on
the signal samples at the output of the RF front-end, that
is, at the early stage of the receiver chain. In this way,
the receiver is able to raise an early warning in case a
distortion is detected. An interfering signal impinging
the antenna with the power level exceeding the noise
floor is expected to be detectable via spectral analysis, by
comparing the estimated PSD of the received signal with
a spectral mask that appropriately represents nominal in-
terference-free conditions. Basic spectral estimation can
be implemented via simple normalized fast Fourier
transform (FFT) or periodogram methods (which are
based anyway on the use of sequences of shorter and
windowed FFTs) as, for example, in [40]. Such nonpara-
metric spectral monitoring techniques are conceptually
simple, but their performance is inherently limited by a
set of factors: they need relatively long observation win-
dows (on the order of several hundreds of milliseconds)
to produce spectral estimates with reduced estimation
variance; periodograms (whichever they are: sample,
Bartletts, Welchs) are biased estimators, which introduce
spectral leakages in correspondence of sharp spectral
peaks and nulls; finally, they are heavily based on the
use of the FFT, which is a demanding resource whose
complexity is superlinear with respect to the number of
input samples. It results that the parameters of the FFT
algorithm used in each specific implementation must be
carefully chosen, taking into account the necessary fre-
quency resolution, the digitization bandwidth, and the
computational resources available to compute each FFT.
Indeed, the FFT length is directly related to the fre-
quency resolution of the spectrum, normalized to the
whole digitization bandwidth.
A different approach, working on the stream of sam-
ples in the time domain, is based on the observation of
the signal, modeled as random process, in the “domain
of the statistical characteristics.” Methods working on
this domain are widely used in disciplines as economics
[41]–[43], biology [44], and others, while a very few exam-
ples can be found in GNSS applications [6], [14], [45].
The main idea behind these methods is that, in the
absence of jamming, the sample provided by the ADC ap-
proximately follows a Gaussian distribution. This fact is
highlighted in the upper plot of Fig. 4 which shows the
histogram of the samples at the ADC output in the ab-
sence of interference. Jamming can make the probability
density function (pdf) of the output samples significantly
deviate from a Gaussian distribution. Thus, jamming can
be revealed by detecting deviations from the Gaussian
distribution. These deviations can be measured, for ex-
ample, considering the skewness and the excess kurtosis
of the ADC samples.
A method based on the statistical characteristics of
the GNSS and RFI signals is described in [14]. The idea
is to characterize the nominal signal y½n" in terms of its
first order pdf pYðxÞ, and to formulate the hypothesis
testing problem by comparing pYðxÞ with an empirical
pdf pXðxÞ, which is estimated using N digital samples.
The method proposed in [14] is based on a theorem due
to Pearson [46] and is known as chi-squared test on
goodness of fit (GoF). The test statistic is defined as
D ¼
Xk
i¼1
ðOi $ EiÞ2
Ei
(11)
where k is the number of bins of the estimated histo-
grams, Ei refers to the ith value of the expected histo-
gram, while Oi is the ith value of the observed histogram.
The two histograms represent pXðxÞ and pYðyÞ, respec-
tively. This test statistic can be seen as an instance of a
random variable, which is, for large N, approximately
!2-distributed with k$ 1 degrees of freedom, as affirmed
by the Pearson theorem [46], [47]. This characterization
allows the selection of a proper threshold, given the
specifications of the detector in terms of false alarm
probability. In [14] the chi-squared test on GoF has also
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been applied to postcorrelation samples. In this case,
the detection of anomalies can be done only after the
evaluation of the search space and/or at the DLL output
and allows the identification of SIS with anomalies.
Other methods working in the domain of the statistical
characteristics can be found in [48] and [49].
Recently, sophisticated detection approaches have
been proposed. They exploit the availability of digital
samples which are used to represent the signal received
in different domains where the presence of the spurious
interfering signals can be more easily detected. For
example, TF analysis techniques can be applied using
several TF distributions (e.g., short-time Fourier,
Wigner–Ville, Choi–Williams, etc.). The goal is to select
a transformed domain where the jamming signal is
maximally concentrated leading to a clear pattern
which can be more easily detected than in the time or
frequency domain. Thus, the performance of such
methods generally depend on the type of interference to
be detected [50]. A critical issue with such family of
techniques is the significant computational burden to be
handled. Another transformed domain is defined by
time-scale analysis techniques, based on the use of the
2-D wavelet transform. These techniques are gaining
interest for GNSS interference monitoring [51], [52].
All these techniques show good detection perfor-
mance, but such a gain is traded off with a significant
computational burden. However, due to the constantly
growing computational capabilities of the processors in
consumer receivers, they are an interesting perspective
solution.
C. Postcorrelation Domain Detection
Postcorrelation techniques exploit the observables
provided by a GNSS receiver after the correlation pro-
cess [33]. The advantage of such approach is that post-
correlation observables are available also in low-cost
mass-market receivers such as the GPS chips integrated
in smartphones. In particular, the C=N0 estimated for
the different satellite signals is also available in the stan-
dard National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA)
messages provided by Android smartphones [32], [53]. In
the presence of jamming, the victim receiver perceives a
significant increase in the noise component. In partic-
ular, N0 is significantly overestimated by the receiver.
In the presence of jamming, the effective C=N0 esti-
mated by the receiver and expressed in linear units is
given by [54]
C
N0
!!!!
eff;lin
¼ C
N0 þ !J (12)
where C, N0, and J have been defined in Section II. !
is the spectral separation coefficient (SSC) [54] and
takes into account the filtering effect performed by a
GNSS receiver when executing the correlation process.
In (12), all the quantities are expressed in linear units.
Thus, in the presence of jamming, C=N0 estimated by
the receiver can be significantly reduced. For this rea-
son, C=N0 has been adopted by several researchers
[32]–[34], [53], [55], [56] as an indicator for jamming
detection.
When considering C=N0 measurements, two general
approaches are possible:
• consider each C=N0 value independently and take
a decision specific to a single satellite signal;
• consider jointly the C=N0 values from all the sig-
nals and perform a collective detection.
An example of the first approach can be found in [56]
which analyzed the statistical properties of the C=N0
estimated by a software-defined radio (SDR) receiver. A
Gaussian model was adopted to describe the pdf of the
measurements and it was shown that, in the absence
of jamming, the mean and standard deviation of the
Gaussian model mainly depend on the satellite eleva-
tion. In the presence of interference, the mean of the
C=N0 estimates is severely affected and thus jamming
can be detected by comparing the C=N0 mean with a
threshold selected according to a predetermined false
alarm probability. In this case, detection is performed
considering a single satellite signal. In order to improve
the detection performance, Calcagno et al. [56] also
suggested to combine the decision taken over several
epochs and using measurements from several satellites.
In particular, a Bernoulli decision scheme was designed.
In [34] and [55], detection approaches based on individual
C=N0 were also considered and it was confirmed that
“C=N0-based detectors could work well in a static sce-
nario, but are not suitable in a dynamic scenario, since
they cannot distinguish between decreased GPS signal
strength and an increased interference level.” This is the
so-called C=N0 ambiguity problem: the estimated C=N0
can decrease either because the signal power C is attenu-
ated or because of the additional noise power introduced
by jamming. Signal attenuation can occur in difficult prop-
agation environments such as in the presence of obstacles,
urban canyons, and foliage. This problem can be partially
mitigated using collective detection approaches. For exam-
ple, in urban canyons or in the presence of multipath,
GNSS signals are hardly attenuated all in the same way:
signals from high elevation satellites are usually less af-
fected by such impairments. On the contrary, jamming
causes a noise increase to all processed signals. This prin-
ciple is illustrated in Fig. 11 which shows the C=N0 values
of the individual satellites tracked during the experiment
considered in Fig. 3. The C=N0 values are affected in a
similar way by the jamming signal. Thus, jamming intro-
duces correlated changes in the C=N0 time series. This
principle has been exploited in [53] to develop a form
of ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA) for jamming
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